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I reestimate the effects of spending using instrumental variables that affect a candidate's ability to raise campaign funds, such as candidate wealth levels. Hhen the endogeneity of candidate spending levels is properly taken into account, the marginal effects of incumbent and challenger spending are roughly equal. In contrast to previous research showing that, because of higher marginal returns to challenger spending, the incumbent's spending advantage cannot explain high incumbent reelection rates, this article shows that in an average Senate election the incumbent's spending advantage yields a 6% increase in the incumbent's vote share. That incumbent spending wins elections has direct implications regarding the consequences of campaign finance reform. My findings imply that equalizing spending levels may significantly increase incumbent defeat rates, and caps on candidate spending may improve the chances of challengers.
In American congressional elections incumbents routinely win reelection. Even in the 1994 Republican landslide, change in the partisan makeup of Congress occurred mainly through open seats switching from the Democrats to the Republicans. A common explanation for high congressional reelection rates is the large campaign spending advantage enjoyed by incumbents. It is widely believed that challenger spending is very important, but there is surprisingly little evidence in the academic literature that incumbent campaign spending has an important effect on congressional election outcomes. In light of the substantial effort incumbents devote to fundraising, as well as some nagging methodological questions about existing academic studies, the effect of incumbent spending on election outcomes remains an unresolved issue.
Accurately measuring how incumbent spending leads to votes is of obvious importance. Politicians want to win elections, and so if money matters, then this will influence their behavior. If campaign spending effects are trivial, then concerns about politicians being purchased by contributions from PACs and other "special interests" are probably exaggerated. Accurate measurement of the effect of campaign spending is essential for evaluating the effects of campaign finance reforms. Finally, most of the academic literature on campaign finance has yielded a provocative finding that fuels additional investigation: For given spending levels, incumbent campaign spending appears to have much smaller marginal returns than challenger spending.
This article measures the effect of campaign spending on Senate election outcomes. I begin by briefly reviewing the academic literature. A key issue in estimating the effect of campaign spending is that campaign spending levels respond to expectations about the closeness of the election. Most research ignores this or downplays its significance. After reviewing the existing studies, I present a model of Senate election outcomes and describe instrumental variables that can be used to estimate the effects of spending. I argue that contrary to a view often expressed (Jacobson 1985 (Jacobson , 1990 , valid instruments can be found to permit the identification of a two-stage least-squares model of the effect of campaign expenditures on election outcomes. The major innovation here is the use of a new set of instrumental variables that permits consistent estimation of the effects of candidate spending. This study employs instrumental variables which shift a candidate's cost of funds, such as candidate wealth levels. If variables such as candidate wealth levels do not have a direct influence on election outcomes, then they can be used to obtain consistent estimates of the effects of spending. Following a description of the model and data, I report the results of model estimation. Ordinary least-squares (OLS) and two-stage leastsquares (TSLS) estimation of a standard model of Senate election outcomes produce very different results. OLS estimation confirms the conventional view that incumbent spending has a lower marginal effect than challenger spending, while TSLS estimation shows the marginal effects of spending by challenger and incumbent to be both statistically equivalent and substantively important. The article concludes with an examination of the implications of the findings. I consider, among other things, how my results regarding campaign spending in Senate elections relate to the more general issue of when campaign spending may be more or less effective. Jacobson's explanation for observed differences in the effectiveness of spending is straightforward and appealing, but there are grounds for skepticism. First, while senators are relatively well known, they have the opportunity to spend money to address new issues or concerns, some of which may not have arisen in previous years. Second, campaigning not only informs the voters about oneself but also brings to light damning information about one's opponent. When the voters do not know much about the challenger, this gives the incumbent a great opportunity to use money to "define" the challenger.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
In theory, incumbent spending may be more effective than challenger spending. Incumbents typically have advantages in organization and expertise that make their expenditures more efficient and therefore more effective dollar for dollar than those of challengers. If this is an important consideration, then the marginal effect of spending by the incumbent may be greater than the marginal effect of challenger spending. A final reason for skepticism is that the actual behavior of incumbents, who are political professionals, appears to contradict the premise that incumbent campaign spending has little effect. If incumbents are sensible, then it is hard to explain their substantial fundraising efforts.2 It is possible that Jacobson has constructed an ingenious theoretical explanation for a nonexistent fact. The true effects of spending may be mismeasured due to methodological problems that result when spending levels are treated as exogenous variables. There are a number of reasons to suspect that regressions which assume spending is exogenous yield biased coefficients. Some reasons to expect that spending levels are influenced by electoral conditions include: (1) As the probability of victory rises, it is easier for a candidate to raise money; (2) if the election looks close, supporters are more likely to contribute to the candidates; and (3) if the incumbent becomes sure of victory, the incumbent scales back fundraising activity. For these reasons and others, if there are factors influencing the election outcome that are not captured in a single-equation regression model, then the effects of spending on election outcomes will be biased due to correlation between the spending levels and the regression error.3 2 This common argument can be refuted if it is believed that the marginal cost of raising funds for the incumbent is very low, since the large amounts of money raised can be easily reconciled with low marginal benefits. Anecdotal evidence suggests otherwise; politicians find raising money distasteful and time consuming. Consider the view of Hubert Humphrey, who called raising funds "a disgusting, degrading, demeaning experience" (Jacobson 1978, 475 To capture the influence of economic conditions on the election outcome, the variables used were State Unemployment Levels in the election year and state unemployment levels in the election year interacted with a dummy variable that is coded as one when the incumbent was from the same party as the president (State Employment Level *Incumbent in Governing Party). It was expected that bad local economic conditions would help all challengers, and it would help them more if they were not from the president's party.
DATA AND METHODS

In
To measure challenger quality, the level of political experience was used.10 Challengers were divided into five groups according to whether they had been (1) a state Governor, (2) 11 It is possible that the challenger quality variable is endogenous, if the challenger's decision to run responds to electoral weakness of the incumbent. While this may be a problem, it may be minor for two reasons. First, candidates enter well in advance of the election, and therefore entry cannot respond to factors that develop nearer the election. Second, as Squire (1991) 18 Several other functional forms were analyzed as well. The major finding of the estimation-that TSLS equalizes the marginal spending effects of incumbent and challenger spending, and that the marginal spending effects for both challenger and incumbent increase substantially over the OLS coefficients when reestimated by TSLS-held for all functional forms tested. challengers have more money to spend on their Senate race. This variable was generated by reading through the descriptions of the upcoming Senate races contained each election year in the Congressional Quarterly election preview issue. Challengers were categorized as wealthy or not based upon the description.
Challenger wealth was set equal to 0 if the Congressional Quarterly election preview listed the challenger's occupation or former occupation as, for example, a public sector job, teacher, military, or lawyer. Challenger wealth was set to 1 if the description indicated a real estate developer, an independent business owner or president of a business, a banker, a top executive, or used terms such as "wealthy," "independently wealthy," "millionaire," or "heir." Overall, challengers' contributions to their own campaign constitute about 8% of total challenger spending. This spending is concentrated in a subset of races, and those classified as wealthy account for a large portion of challenger self-financing. The third instrumental variable was based on Lagged Spending by Senate incumbents and challengers.23 The exact variable used was the sum of spending by the incumbent and challenger in the previous Senate election in the state. Due to the staggered nature of Senate elections, the previous race and the current race rarely involve the same incumbent or challenger. The variable is therefore free from the criticism that might be applied to lagged spending by the same candidate, namely, that specific candidate attributes are correlated with both the regression error and past fundraising levels. Lagged spending should be correlated with the included spending variables for the current election, however, since candidates from the same states may face similar fundraising environments. Table 1 shows summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. 21 A final reason that spending varies inversely with state population is that the legal limits on contributions are fixed sums, not scaled to state population. 22 In Table 3 , column 2, I present the TSLS coefficient estimates for the effect of incumbent and challenger campaign spending, based on the complete sample. The coefficients are 6.46 and -6.00 (n = 229), respectively. When the sample was restricted to states with a population of less than 6 million, the coefficients were 6.78 and -7.00 (n = 142); for 8 million or less, 7.05 and -6.61 (n = 148); for 10 million or less, 6.88 and -6.71 (n = 152). All coefficients were significant at the 5% or 1% level. Table 2 reports the rOLS estimation of the Senate election model for both the full sample of 229 elections and the subsample of 156 elections for which lagged spending was available. The OLS regressions show that, for any given level of spending, challenger spending has roughly twice the marginal effect of incumbent spending. To get some perspective on the coefficient magnitudes in Table 2 , I examine the effect on the incumbent's share of the vote of a small change in candidate spending levels. Consider the effect of increasing spending by $300,000 in a state with a voting age population of 3 million. Since the marginal return decreases as spending increases, base levels must be specified for calculating the marginal effects. Table 2 indicate that, for any given level of spending, an additional dollar is only half as effective for the incumbent as for the challenger. Second, since the benefits from campaign spending exhibit decreasing returns to scale (i.e., the logarithmic function is concave), and incumbents typically have a larger campaign budget than challengers, any spending boost by incumbents is operating at a "flatter" portion of the curve relating money spent to votes received, and so yields fewer votes. Using the mean values of incumbent and challenger spending and the OLS regression coefficients, the total effect of candidate spending on Senate elections was also calculated. The average incumbent outspent the average challenger nearly two to one, but this larger campaign budget was more than offset by the higher marginal return to challenger spending. The total effect of campaign spending was a 4.97% reduction in the incumbent's vote share.24
OLS Estimation Results
A formal test of the hypothesis that the coefficients on challenger and incumbent spending are of equal magnitude was performed for the regressions reported in Table 2 . An F-test of the restriction that challenger and incumbent spending effects are of equal size was rejected at the .01 level.
The regressions show that, for any given level of candidate spending, incumbent spending has a smaller marginal effect than challenger spending, but the marginal effect is in the intuitively expected direction and is statistically significant. These results are close to those found in Abramowitz (1988) but different from those reported by Jacobson (1985) , who finds incumbent spending statistically insignificant.25
The preliminary conclusion from OLS regressions is that, for Senate elections, the extreme form of the incumbency spending problem, where incumbent spending has no effect, does not exist. Incumbent spending helps, but at any given level of spending, it is only about half as effective as challenger spending. If the arguments regarding the endogeneity of spending made earlier are correct, however, then OLS does not provide consistent estimates of the model. In order to 24 get accurate measurement of the effect of spending on the incumbent's vote percentage, the estimation technique should account for the endogeneity of the spending variables. Table 3 reports the results of TSLS estimation of the Senate election model. The instruments used in the first-stage regressions for the second-stage estimation results shown in columns 1 and 2 were the challenger wealth variable and voting age population; all three instrumental variables were used in the first-stage regressions for the second-stage results shown in columns 3 and 4.26 Table 4 reports the reduced form estimation of the candidate spending levels.
Reestimation using instrumental variables shows an increase in the campaign spending coefficients for both challenger and incumbent, as well as an especially large increase in the effect of incumbent spending. In Table   26 Specification tests to detect heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation were also performed. Comparing the standard error produced by OLS to those generated by White's (1980) heteroscedasticity robust estimator revealed very little evidence of heteroscedasticity. Some senators appear in the data set more than once, raising the possibility of autocorrelated errors. To explore this possibility, the correlation between residuals and six-year lagged residuals was examined. Standard tests for autocorrelation could not reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation, even at the .10 level.
3, column 2 shows that the marginal effects of incumbent and challenger spending are roughly equal, in contrast to the OLS results. The hypothesis that the coefficients are equal cannot be rejected even at the .10 level. One possible objection to the regressions reported in Table 3 is that the instruments may not be exogenous.27 In order to test the assumption of exogeneity of the instruments, a test of the overidentifying restrictions was performed. The hypothesis that the instruments were exogenous could not be rejected at even the .10 level.28 27 Wealthy candidates may be attractive to voters if their wealth reduces the chances of corruption, or they may be unattractive if they appear out of touch with the concerns of average people or if wealth inspires resentment. The overall importance of these effects is likely to be small, and the net direction is unclear. It should be noted that among the large body of empirical work on Senate elections, it seems that candidate wealth has never been included as an explanatory variable. Some objections may also be raised regarding the use of population as an instrument, especially if there are scale economies that are not accounted for in the model linking campaign spending to election results. It is not clear that there are important scale economies to spending, and the evidence sometimes taken to indicate their existence (spending is lower in larger states) may be sensibly explained by variation in the supply of funds available to Senate candidates. 28 A formal test of endogeneity of spending levels was performed Briefly examining the reduced form regressions presented in Table 4 , the challenger wealth, voting age population, and lagged spending variables all had the expected signs. There was a statistically significant positive relationship between challenger spending and challenger wealth. Both incumbent and challenger spending showed a statistically significant positive relationship with lagged spending, and negative relationship with voting age population. One interesting finding is the large effect of challenger political experience on challenger spending levels. Political troubles for the incumbent due to controversies are also strongly associated with high levels of spending for both candidates.
The regressions in Table 3 show that, for any given level of spending, incumbent and challenger spending have similar marginal effects on Senate elections. using a regression-based version of the Hausman-Wu (Hausman 1983) specification test. The fitted values from a regression of incumbent spending and challenger spending on the instruments were included, along with incumbent spending and challenger spending in an OLS regression of the incumbent vote share model. Under the null hypothesis that incumbent and challenger spending are exogenous, the coefficients on the fitted variables should be zero. The F-test of the exclusion restriction is distributed F(2,192) under the null hypothesis that spending levels are exogenous, and the null is rejected at the .01 level. The test was performed using the challenger wealth variable, voting age population, and lagged spending.
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These new regression coefficients can be used to recalculate the effects of spending an additional 10 cents per voter by challengers and incumbents, as well as the total effect of candidate spending on Senate election outcomes. Again, the base levels are 57 cents per voter for incumbents and 30 cents per voter for challengers. The results in Table 3 , column 2, imply that increasing challenger spending by 10 cents per voter leads to a 1.69% decrease in the incumbent's vote percentage, while a similar increase by incumbents increases their vote percentage by 1.00%. In contrast to the OLS estimates, when we correct for endogeneity bias, we find that for any given level of spending, campaign spending by the incumbent and challenger have similar effects. Yet, raising spending levels a fixed amount still benefits the challenger more than the incumbent. This stems from the fact that the average incumbent has a much larger campaign budget than the average challenger, and the return to additional spending falls as the total amount spent increases.
Recalculation of the total effect of spending shows that the new coefficient estimates reverse the earlier conclusions about the influence of candidate spending on Senate elections. Contrary to the findings based on the OLS regression coefficients, the overall effect of campaign spending strongly favors the incumbent. Us- ing mean incumbent and challenger spending levels and the new regression'coefficients, the total effect of spending is to boost the incumbent vote by 6.28%, in sharp contrast to the OLS figure of a 4.97% reduction. This reversal is due to the fact that, when endogeneity is taken into account, for each level of campaign spending the incumbent and challenger are roughly equally effective (i.e., the regression coefficients are of the same magnitude), rather than incumbent spending being only about half as effective as challenger spending. Since typical incumbents spend much more than their opponents, the larger campaign budget of incumbents translates into a large electoral advantage. The OLS coefficients, in contrast, imply that the advantage of the incumbent's larger campaign budget is outweighed by the greater effectiveness of challenger spending. On the second count, I find that spending by Senate candidates, including incumbents, is very effective. According to the conventional explanation, spending by House incumbents does not increase their vote share because they are already well known. Accordingly, since Senate incumbents and, for the sake of argument let us stipulate Senate challengers, are also well known, spending by Senate candidates should have only minimal effect on the vote. On the contrary, I find that spending by both the challenger and the incumbent has large and statistically significant effects on vote shares.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
To sum up, the results indicate that OLS underestimates the effectiveness of incumbent spending in Senate elections. What is more, the new estimates are not easily unified with the standard theory used to explain the difference in the effectiveness of incumbent and challenger spending levels. This implies that the contrary results of some previous work may follow from failure to 410 account for endogeneity of spending levels, rather than from unique characteristics of Senate elections.
The finding that incumbent spending wins elections has important implications for recent American politics. Campaign finance, and specifically the level of incumbent spending, is a potentially critical factor in the competitiveness of congressional elections. The finding that incumbent spending effects are important also requires reconsideration of the consequences of campaign finance reform. The debate typically turns on what happens to challengers and neglects incumbents. Spending limits that apply to both are seen as severely biased in favor of incumbents. As Jacobson (1980, 186) argues, "campaign spending does have an important effect on who wins [congressional elections] and it is the amount spent by challengers (and other disadvantaged candidates) that actually makes the difference. Spending limits, if they have any effect at all on competition, can only work to the detriment of the challenger." In a companion paper, I conduct simulations of policy alternatives and show that, when the new estimates of incumbent spending effects are used, the conclusions inspired by the traditional view of campaign spending need major revision (Gerber 1993 ). For example, spending caps, even if set lower than some challengers' campaign spending levels, can significantly increase the chances of challenger victory.
Important issues remain to be addressed. First, the mechanism by which campaign spending influences vote totals is summarized here by a reduced form relationship. This may be a useful approximation of a complicated process, but additional work that attempts to isolate cases in which spending may have greater or lesser effect on election outcomes could lead to important new insights into the role of money in elections.29 One useful direction would be to study variations in resource allocation by candidates, which would permit analysis of when different kinds of spending are most effective.30 Finally, this paper estimates one equation in a multiequation system. Another area for research is to extend current work to examine in detail the sources of candidate funds. The goal of such analysis would be to construct and estimate a full system model linking contributors' and candidates' decisions. 
